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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: An attorney is contacted by a
potential client who claims that he has purchased a product that was
falsely advertised by its manufacturer. In researching the claim, the
attorney learns that two public agencies have threatened suit against the
manufacturer and the filing of a formal complaint appears imminent.
The manufacturer has already publicly acknowledged its error and
convened a special committee to determine how to make amends, so any
complaint would likely be moot and there will be no damages for the
plaintiff. Is it in the economic interest of the plaintiff’s attorney to file
suit against the manufacturer? Is it in society’s interest for the plaintiff’s
attorney to file such a suit?

* J.D. 2005, University of San Diego School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Thomas Smith for his helpful suggestions and his wife Maura Logan for
her insights and support. The author dedicates this casenote to his grandmother, Ruth
Olsen, and the memory of his grandfather, Karl Olsen (1917-2005), for all of their
encouragement and love during law school.
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The goal of a sound public policy regarding attorneys’ fees should be
to harmonize these inquiries as much as possible, but the California
Supreme Court’s December 2004 decision in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. may produce quite divergent answers.1 The answer to the first
question is clear: an attorney who files such a suit can not only receive
fees for “catalyzing” any remedial action on the part of the
manufacturer, even if the action is likely moot by the time it is
considered by a court,2 but the attorney may also recover the costs of
litigating the exact amount of those attorneys’ fees.3 The question whether
the suit is beneficial to society is more troublesome. If the Attorney
General is already investigating the manufacturer, there would appear to
be little need for a “private attorney general” to enter the fray as well.
This is especially so where the dispute involves the legal relationship
between two private parties—there is no imperative here to enforce
important civil rights against a recalcitrant government entity. Moreover,
the manufacturer has already admitted its error, and it is not evident that
it will offer an inadequate remedy.
Unfortunately, this is exactly the sort of scenario that the California
Supreme Court has sanctioned in Graham. The court has interpreted the
state’s attorneys’ fees law to encourage such “tagalong” suits that appear
to have little if any social utility.4 The Graham court has stretched the
language of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 far
beyond what its plain meaning will bear. The State Supreme Court has
thus managed to transform an important civil rights fee-shifting statute
into a tool for private disputes that the dissent darkly predicts will make
California “a mecca for plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys throughout the
country . . . .”5
II. THE FACTS AND ISSUES OF GRAHAM
Justice William Brennan once described appeals to determine
attorneys’ fees as “one of the least socially productive types of litigation
imaginable.”6 Within this rarefied class of pointless litigation, Graham
may indeed be the most farcical of all. The underlying lawsuit did not
produce even a consent decree, let alone a jury verdict. The lower courts
ultimately awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys $762,830, yet “roughly 90
1. 101 P.3d 140 (Cal. 2004), modified, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 16 (Jan. 12, 2005).
2. See id. at 147.
3. See id. at 157 (“[I]t is well established that plaintiffs and their attorneys may
recover attorney fees for [litigating] fee-related matters.”).
4. Justice Chin refers to such suits as “tagalong” suits in his Graham dissent
because of their relationship to public agency action. Id. at 171 (Chin, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 161.
6. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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percent of this award was for fees plaintiffs generated while seeking
fees.”7
The original dispute arose out of DaimlerChrysler’s attempts to
develop a “sporty version” of one of its existing truck models.8 The
original model could tow 6400 pounds, and DaimlerChrysler advertised
that its 1998 and 1999 Dakota R/T trucks had similar capacities.9 In
fact, these trucks could safely tow no more than 2000 pounds, lest the
suspensions bottom out, stressing the frames and increasing fatigue and
wear.10
By February 1999, the carmaker had established a “response team” to
address the problem.11 By June, DaimlerChrysler had taken steps to
replace the incorrect marketing materials and owner’s manuals for the
trucks it had yet to sell, but the carmaker was still distributing brochures
misrepresenting the towing capacity as of August 1999.12 The carmaker
informed those who had already purchased the vehicles that they should
not attempt to tow more than 2000 pounds, and “began to address
remedial measures for customers who had bought or leased their Dakota
R/T’s under the incorrect marketing program.”13 DaimlerChrysler offered
$300 refunds to buyers who had purchased hitches to safely increase the
trucks’ towing capacities, and by the summer DaimlerChysler had
authorized dealers to repurchase or replace the trucks “on a case-by-case
basis, but only for customers who demanded such a remedy.”14
On July 29, 1999, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney contacted
DaimlerChrysler about the problem and threatened legal action; on
August 10, the California Attorney General joined the effort.15 The
agencies delayed filing an action, to provide an opportunity for the
carmaker to respond to their charges.16
7. Graham, 101 P.3d at 163 (Chin, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 144 (majority opinion).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 145.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Unfortunately, the majority opinion stated vaguely that DaimlerChrysler
started its buy back program “by the summer,” even though the exact date is clearly
relevant in determining to what extent the plaintiff’s civil action “catalyzed” the
carmaker’s remedial measures. If “by the summer” means before August 23, 1999,
when the action was filed, the plaintiffs have a much weaker argument that they were
responsible for the remedy the carmaker offered.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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In the meantime, a group of plaintiffs, only one of whom actually
lived and purchased his truck in California, filed a complaint in Los
Angeles County Superior Court on August 23.17 The plaintiffs alleged a
single breach of warranty cause of action seeking the return of their
purchase or lease payments, compensatory damages, and attorneys’
fees.18 On September 10, DaimlerChrysler offered to repurchase or
replace all previous Dakota R/T trucks.19 The trial court determined that
DaimerChrysler had already offered the plaintiffs all of the relief they
sought and dismissed the action as moot.20
How much is a moot, seven-page complaint that tags on to the
investigation of two public agencies worth?21 The trial court awarded
the plaintiffs’ attorneys $762,830 for their efforts.22 The Court of
Appeals affirmed.23
The only issue that remained for the California Supreme Court on
appeal was the appropriateness of the attorneys’ fees, and the court
upheld the award, four to three.24 The majority, purporting to interpret
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, virtually ignored the
intertwined questions of whether private enforcement was “necessary”
and whether the suit enforced “an important right affecting the public
interest,” finding these prerequisites for the award of fees met.25 The
bulk of the court’s discussion centered around whether a plaintiff who
had plausibly changed the defendant’s behavior through the threat of
litigation, but never actually achieved a judicial ruling on the merits of
his claim, could be awarded attorneys’ fees. The Graham court chose to
part ways with the United States Supreme Court, which had rejected the
“catalyst” theory for the award of attorneys’ fees in Buckhannon Board
& Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health of Human
Resources in 2001.26 The Graham court thus interpreted the term
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 146.
23. Id. The trial court found the “lodestar” amount to be $329,620, to which it
applied a multiplier of 2.25 because the case was taken on a contingency fee and
involved further litigation of the proper attorneys’ fees. Id. at 156-57. For discussion of
the calculation of the lodestar amount and multipliers, see infra notes 106-06 and
accompanying text.
24. Chief Justice George and Justices Kennard and Werdegar joined Justice
Moreno’s majority opinion; Justices Baxter and Brown joined Justice Chin’s dissent.
See id. at 161.
25. Id. at 156.
26. 532 U.S. 598, 610 (rejecting the “catalyst theory” for the award of attorneys’
fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
For criticism of Buckhannon, see Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Board & Care
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“successful party,” as stated in section 1021.5, to mean a “party to
litigation that achieves its objectives,” rather than a party that forces a
change in the legal rights between parties.27 Finally, the court found that
the plaintiffs’ attorneys could be awarded “fees on fees” for the cost of
litigating the issue of attorneys’ fees.28 The case was remanded to the
lower courts to consider the award under the Supreme Court’s new
interpretation of section 1021.5.29
III. INTERPRETING SECTION 1021.5
Graham appears to present a straightforward exercise in statutory
interpretation. California’s attorneys’ fees statute was adopted in 1977,30
on the heels of landmark federal attorneys’ fees laws passed by the 94th
Congress.31 In 1975, Congress enacted fee-shifting provisions for
violations of the Voting Rights Act,32 and the following year extended
one-way fee-shifting to all civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.33 California’s scheme, however, differs substantially from the
federal scheme. The federal Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act34
was confined, as the title Congress bestowed upon it indicates, to the
enforcement of civil rights laws that are explicitly enumerated in the

Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources: To the
Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils . . . and the Attorney’s Fees, 36 AKRON L. REV.
363 (2003) (arguing that Buckhannon will discourage civil rights litigation and
encouraging Congress to intervene).
27. Graham, 101 P.3d at 151; cf. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (“Our precedents
thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of
attorney’s fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the
parties.”).
28. Graham, 101 P.3d at 172 (Chin, J., dissenting) (coining the term “fees on
fees”).
29. Id. at 161.
30. The sums paid to lawyers are variously referred to by courts, commentators,
and Congress as attorney, attorney’s, and attorneys’ fees. For the sake of consistency, I
have used the last form throughout, regardless of the number of attorneys actually
involved, except when quoting opinions or legislative enactments that use the alternative
forms.
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005). For a discussion of the
genesis and original policy objectives of section 1021.5, see Jeff Thomas, Comment, The
Private Attorney General in California—An Evolution of the Species, 18 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 843, 844-47 (1981).
32. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat 400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (2000)).
33. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)).
34. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)).
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statute.35 Where Congress has chosen to extend fee-shifting provisions
beyond the context of civil rights enforcement, such as certain claims
under the Endangered Species Act or the Americans with Disabilities
Act, it has generally done so explicitly.36
The California Legislature, however, drafted the state’s attorneys’ fees
statute more broadly.37 The specific claims for which attorneys’ fees
may be awarded are not specified in the statute. Instead, fees can be
awarded in “any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest.”38 Nonetheless, the legislature
placed some limits on this provision. The lawsuit must confer “a
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary . . . on the general
public or a large class of persons . . . .”39 Moreover, the “the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement . . . [must] make the award
appropriate. . . .”40
Although Congress has frequently amended attorneys’ fees provisions
to encompass new types of claims, the California legislature has left
section 1021.5 intact since 1977, with one insignificant exception.41
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has steadily expanded the
scope of the law’s provisions to make it applicable to an ever broader
array of claims.42 After the Graham decision, however, the plain

35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) (referring to specific types of claims that have
been added to the statute since 1976, such as those falling under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 or the Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000).
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000) (Endangered Species Act); 42 U.S.C. §
12205 (2000) (Americans with Disabilities Act).
37. Section 1021.5 reads in relevant part:
Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against
one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on
the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against
another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such
fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. A 1993 amendment added language only relevant to suits involving public
entities. See 1993 Cal. Stat. 645.
42. An early commentator on section 1021.5 could find only one private attorney
general case involving a private defendant that was litigated in the first four years after
the statute was passed. See Thomas, supra note 31, at 862. Suits against private actors,
however, have become increasingly common. See, e.g., Graham v. DaimlerChrysler,
101 P.3d 140 (Cal. 2004) (defendant carmaker); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1991) (defendant bank).
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meaning of section 1021.5 can no longer bear the high court’s
interpretive gloss.43
The California Supreme Court interpreted three important phrases in
section 1021.5 so as to render them virtually meaningless. The court has
conflated “an important right affecting the public interest” with any
private right having an incidental benefit on third parties. Its approval of
the “necessity” of private action under these procedural facts essentially
removes that language from the statute. Finally, the court broadly
construed “successful party” to require that the threat of suit change a
defendant’s behavior, rather than the filing of a meritorious suit.44
A. A Public or Private Interest?
The trial court found that Graham’s suit “resulted in the enforcement
of an important right affecting the public interest, . . . the protection and

43. The Graham majority wisely rejected the resort to the legislative history of section
1021.5, noting that “[m]aterial showing the motive or understanding of an individual
legislator, including the bill’s author, his or her staff, or other interested persons, is
generally not considered. This is because such materials are generally not evidence of
the Legislature’s collective intent.” Graham, 101 P.3d at 152 n.5 (quoting Metro. Water
Dist. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 329-30 (Ct. App. 2000)) (internal
citations omitted). It would be doubly foolish to infer the intent of legislators from a
different enactment. But it is nonetheless interesting, if legally irrelevant, to note that the
California Assembly, with a similar political composition, had, two years before it
enacted section 1021.5, passed the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).
CAL CIV CODE § 3333.2(b) (2005). The damage caps on medical malpractice awards by
MICRA have become President George W. Bush’s model for national medical
malpractice reform. MICRA clearly recognized that the overproduction of certain suits
vindicating private economic rights, see infra Part III-D, will be borne by consumers. It
is very difficult to believe that an Assembly that enacted MICRA would therefore have
intended section 1021.5 to be used so far beyond the context of civil rights as to
subsidize suits pursuing private economic rights.
44. The Graham court’s treatment of the issue of “fees on fees” is also deeply
flawed, but the judicial reasoning and policy concerns differ from these three core issues,
and thus the fees on fees issue will not be considered at length in this casenote. Section
1021.5 does not mention at all whether attorneys’ fees can be awarded for the fee
litigation itself, and the California Supreme Court has viewed its inherent authority to
imply attorneys’ fees quite broadly. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-15
(Cal. 1977) (“Serrano III”) (explicitly rejecting the United States Supreme Court’s
refusal to imply attorneys’ fees without explicit legislative authorization in Alyeska
Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). From a policy perspective,
appellate litigation over attorneys’ fees is completely unproductive, and should be
strongly discouraged in a manner that would be inappropriate for the general provisions
of section 1021.5. Because both parties as law firms are likely able to bear the cost of
litigation, two-way fee-shifting is probably appropriate in such cases.

1301

LOGAN.DOC

12/22/2005 11:23 AM

enforcement of consumer rights, including highway safety.”45 Because
of the plaintiffs’ suits, “thousands of consumers received pecuniary
benefits and enhanced safety. Thousands more are likely to benefit from
it if DaimlerChrysler and/or other manufacturers are deterred from
similar conduct in the future.”46 The Graham majority, reviewing this
determination under an abuse of discretion standard, asserted that the
question whether the plaintiffs’ action conferred a public benefit “need
not detain us long” and affirmed that Graham’s suit satisfied the public
interest prong of section 1021.5.47
The majority’s flippancy, however, was hardly warranted. The court
essentially conflated suits for public benefit, what we may think of as
traditional civil rights suits, with actions enforcing private rights that
have an incidental benefit to a large number of third parties. The
significance of the distinction is evident under a law and economics
analysis. The enforcement of civil rights under a pure American rule,
where parties pay their own attorneys’ fees regardless of who prevails,
may be problematic because the value to society of a successfully
prosecuted suit may be far greater than any economic gain that may
accrue to the plaintiff or his attorney. Thus, for example, the value to
society of a racially integrated school district may far exceed the
economic damages that plaintiffs who suffer from segregation may be
able to quantify and prove.48 Attorneys’ fees statutes therefore allow the
defendant, usually some government entity, to transfer legal resources to
certain plaintiffs and essentially subsidize a service that is underproduced
in the marketplace for legal representation.49
However, in suits involving private economic rights, there is no
“market failure” that results in the underproduction of certain suits. A
rational plaintiff will file suit if he believes that his potential recovery,
discounted for the possibility of failure on the merits, will exceed his
legal costs. While the enforcement of, for example, consumer rights
against corporate defendants might serve a public interest, a code of civil
45. Graham, 101 P.3d at 146.
46. Id. at 146.
47. Id. at 156.
48. Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 207-11 (1997) (explaining how the
availability of attorneys’ fees drives civil rights litigation).
49. I use the terms “subsidize” and “subsidy” in this paper not to refer to
government financial support for litigants, but the forced transfer of legal resources,
through the award of attorneys’ fees, from defendants to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’
actions are therefore subsidized to the extent that they deviate from the equilibrium
engendered by the pure American rule, whereby the litigants in a civil action bear their
own attorneys’ fees. See Part III-C, infra. California explicitly recognized the American
rule as its general rule for attorneys’ fees in 1872 with the enactment of California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.
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procedure without fee-shifting already incentivizes such suits through
the damages remedies available to the plaintiff and the availability of the
modern class action device for aggregating claims.50
This principle was well-stated when the California Supreme Court
first construed the newly enacted section 1021.5 in 1979. In Woodland
Hills Residents Association v. City Council of Los Angeles, the high
court observed, “An award on the ‘private attorney general’ theory is
appropriate when the cost of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his
personal interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit
placed a burden on the plaintiff ‘out of proportion to his individual stake
in the matter.’”51 As a state appeals court later explained, “[section]
1021.5 was not designed as a method for rewarding litigants motivated
by their own pecuniary interests who only coincidentally protect the
public interest.”52
The California Supreme Court initially held tightly to this formulation
in Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Commission.53 The
court rejected a claim for attorneys’ fees by a private landowner who
argued that his challenge to the Coastal Commission’s permitting
process would deter undesirable conduct by the agency in the future,
thus conferring a broadly shared public benefit.54 More recently, an
intermediate court of appeals interpreted Pacific Legal Foundation to
mean that “the possibility that the lawsuit convey[s] a cautionary
message to the defendant about its conduct [is] insufficient to satisfy the
significant public benefit requirement.”55
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
51. 593 P.2d 200, 213 (Cal. 1979) (quoting County of Inyo v. City of L.A., 144
Cal. Rptr. 71, 76 (Ct. App. 1978)). The phrase “transcend the individual plaintiff’s
pecuniary interest” derives from Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (“Serrano III”)
(Cal. 1977), which was decided shortly before the California legislature adopted the
current statutory language of § 1021.5.
52. Beach Colony II Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 485, 491 (Ct.
App. 1985).
53. 655 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1982).
54. Id. at 311.
55. Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632, 636 (Ct. App. 1998);
see also Planned Parenthood v. City of Santa Maria, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 395 (Ct. App.
1993) (interests of the general public were incidental to Planned Parenthood’s primary
objective of obtaining funds in its action to invalidate a restriction conditioning receipt of
grant money on waiver of privacy rights); Kistler v. Redwoods Cmty. Coll. Dist., 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 417, 423 (Ct. App. 1993) (terminated community college employees improperly
deprived of accrued vacation pay were not seeking to establish new law on a question of
public importance but were simply seeking wages due them); Wang v. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement, 268 Cal. Rptr. 669, 675 (Ct. App. 1990) (any public benefit
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Instead of reaffirming this principle of law, however, the Graham
court confused the matter by relying on a highly problematic Court of
Appeals decision, Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank.56 That dispute over
attorneys’ fees grew out of a massive class action against the defendant
bank for overcharging certain credit card fees.57 The Beasley court,
however, made no attempt to analyze whether the plaintiffs’ suit
transcended their own financial interests. Rather, the court declared that
“the question whether there was an important public interest at stake
merely calls for an examination of the subject matter of the action—i.e.,
whether the right involved was of sufficient societal importance.”58 The
Graham court substituted the mechanical Beasley approach for any
serious consideration of how Graham vindicated anything other than his
own personal property rights.59 After Graham, any suit that can be
resulting from general contractor’s challenge of an administrative interpretation of a
Labor Code section was incidental to the contractor’s personal financial stake in the
matter).
56. 1 Cal. Rptr. 459 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 101
P.3d 140, 156 (Cal. 2004) (relying on Beasley approach).
57. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461.
58. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (quoting § 1021.5(a)).
59. Graham, 101 P.3d at 156. What I identify in Part III-A as the public interest
prong of section 1021.5, that is, whether the suit transcends the personal stake of the
plaintiffs, has been the source of considerable doctrinal confusion. The Woodland Hills,
593 P.2d at 213, and Beach Colony, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 491, courts analyzed the question
as part of the “necessity” prong, that is, whether “the necessity and financial burden of
private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.” § 1021.5(b). On the
other hand, Flannery, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636, considered the financial interests of the
plaintiff in terms of whether the suit conferred a significant benefit on a large class of
persons. § 1021.5(a). Justice Chin, in his dissent in Graham, raises the issue under the
public interest prong, describing Graham’s suit as “a vindication of personal rights, not
an important right affecting the general public.” 101 P.3d at 146, 170 (Chin, J.,
dissenting).
Fortunately, the differences in these approaches are more superficial than substantive.
Section 1021.5 is written in general language, and the various prongs inevitably bleed
into one another. Whether a “significant benefit” has been “conferred . . . on a large
class of persons” is clearly an important factor in determining whether the plaintiff has
vindicated “an important right affecting the public interest.” Likewise, whether the
plaintiff vindicated “an important right affecting the public interest” is an important
factor in determining whether “the necessity and financial burden of private
enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate.”
The logical flaw of the Beasley court was to ignore the overarching inquiry
contemplated in section 1021.5, the necessity of private enforcement, in favor of a
simplistic and formalistic view of discrete elements of the statute. The court dismissed
Wells Fargo’s argument that the plaintiffs’ suit “vindicated only the private rights of
Wells Fargo cardholders, rather than benefiting the public as a whole.” Beasley, 1 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 465. The court insisted that this argument
confuses the question whether there was an important public interest at stake
with the question whether a ‘significant benefit’ has been ‘conferred on the
general public or a large class of persons . . . .’ The significant benefit
criterion calls for an examination whether the litigation has had a beneficial
impact on the public as a whole or on a group of private parties which is
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characterized as protecting consumers will provide the requisite public
interest,60 and therefore the test collapses into an inquiry of how large the
plaintiff class is.61 The California Supreme Court in Graham completely
ignored the Woodland Hills language about “transcend[ing] . . . personal
interest;”62 rather than citing its own precedent, it relied on a dubiously
reasoned appeals court opinion.63
However, the Graham majority stretches the definition of public
interest even beyond Beasley. While Beasley was a class action to
recover fees “on behalf of hundreds of thousands of Wells Fargo

sufficiently large to justify a fee award. This criterion thereby implements the
general requirement that the benefit provided by the litigation inures primarily
to the public. In contrast, the question whether there was an important public
interest at stake merely calls for an examination of the subject matter of the
action—i.e., whether the right involved was of sufficient societal importance.
Id. Wells Fargo, however, was not confused in questioning whether the suit vindicated a
right that transcended the personal financial interests of the plaintiffs, just as Woodland
Hills, Beach Colony, and Flannery had considered before under various prongs of
section 1021.5. The Beasley court replaced any such inquiry with a simple two-part test:
is the subject matter of the action important, and does it benefit a large number of
people? While the satisfaction of this test is no doubt essential for an award of attorneys’
fees under section 1021.5, this simplistic test cannot tell us whether a suit transcends the
personal interests of the plaintiffs, let alone whether this renders private enforcement of
the right necessary.
60. The Beasley court observed that consumer protection actions “have long been
judicially recognized to be vital to the public interest.” Id. at 465 (citations omitted).
But how does the judiciary determine the vindication of rights granted by a statute
enacted by the legislature is “vital to the public interest” while the vindication of rights
granted by another statute is not? Under Beasley, and now Graham, the judge is
essentially asked to render his or her own personal judgment about the importance of
various laws. This certainly contravenes any notion that the judge is the faithful agent of
the legislature in interpreting the law. The California Supreme Court acknowledged this
in Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1315 (Cal. 1977) (“Serrano III”), which recognized
the inherent power of state courts to award attorneys’ fees, but the court attempted to
avoid the problem of judges selecting which laws to enforce by declaring that the
vindication of any right under the state Constitution could justify an award of attorneys’
fees.
61. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (“The question whether a significantly large
number of ‘private’ persons was benefited so as to justify a fee award is pertinent only to
the significant benefit criterion . . . .”).
62. Woodland Hills, 593 P.2d at 213.
63. Graham, 101 P.3d at 156 (relying on the “public interest” and “significant
benefit” rules of Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, a California Court of Appeals decision).
The irony of this test is that the strongest case for an award of attorneys’ fees under
section 1021.5 is the modern consumer class action, which, by pooling claims, provides
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys that would be infeasible to pursue individually, and
allowing for recovery of fees out of a common fund.

1305

LOGAN.DOC

12/22/2005 11:23 AM

customers,”64 the plaintiffs in Graham were never certified as a class.65
In fact, only one of the plaintiffs actually lived and purchased his truck
in California.66 This, of course, did not trouble the trial court, which
found that “thousands of consumers received pecuniary benefits and
enhanced safety. Thousands more are likely to benefit from it if
DaimlerChrysler and/or other manufacturers are deterred from similar
conduct in the future.”67
The problem with this characterization of the case is that the plaintiffs
filed suit on a single claim of breach of warranty.68 They sought no
declaratory or injunctive relief that could be seen to “transcend” their
personal economic interests.69 As the dissent points out, “Maximizing
plaintiffs’ pecuniary gain does nothing to enhance public safety.”70
Unfortunately, the Graham majority opinion sanctions an antithetical
proposition. The pursuit of private economic interest provides an
incidental deterrent that renders it a public interest eligible for subsidized
legal resources.
The ramifications of this holding are potentially explosive. It is
difficult to see why the prosecution of any tort suit against a corporate or
government defendant could not result in fee-shifting to plaintiffs.71
Any lawsuit filed by a plaintiff has the potential to pressure a defendant
64. Beasley, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465.
65. Graham, 101 P.3d at 145.
66. Id. at 162 (Chin, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 146.
68. Id. at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting).
69. Symptomatic of the majority’s misapprehension of the rationale behind section
1021.5 is its decision to view this prong of the test under an abuse of discretion standard,
following Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 146 (Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 246 Cal. Rptr. 806, 812 (Ct. App. 1988)). This
deference to the trial court may be appropriate if applying section 1021.5 merely requires
counting the number of actual plaintiffs or those whom it can plausibly be claimed
benefited from the action. However, determining whether an action transcends personal
interest is essentially a question of law concerning which types of suits are appropriately
subsidized by defendants. Thus, in Pacific Legal Foundation, the high court found that
the plaintiff homeowners’ suit against the Coastal Commission was not eligible for
attorneys’ fees as a matter of law because it did not affect a public right broader than
their interests as landowners. Pac. Legal Found. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 655 P.2d 306,
311 (Cal. 1982).
70. Graham, 101 P.3d at 170 (Chin, J., dissenting).
71. In fact, it is difficult to see why the Graham rationale could not be applied to
corporations suing corporations for unfair business practices, antitrust violations, and the
like. Preventing corporate abuses is certainly a “public interest” that will benefit a large
swathe of the citizenry. In theory, such an application of the Graham approach should
be undermined by section 1021.5(c)—that an award of attorneys’ fees is only appropriate
if “such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.”
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005). Presumably, corporate litigants
have the resources to support their legal actions such that it would not be in the interests
of justice to award attorneys’ fees out of their damage awards. However, there is no
discussion of this in Graham as an equitable concept.
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to change some aspect of its policy—this is inherent in the potentially
coercive power of a civil action. Thus, any plaintiffs’ attorney who
drafts a complaint so as to link his clients’ personal economic interests
with some marginal deterrent benefit will have a winning argument for
attorneys’ fees under Graham.72 By obliterating the distinction between
suits that deserve special subsidy and typical private actions that may
have an incidental public benefit, the court has turned an important civil
rights statute into a boon for plaintiffs seeking purely economic
recoveries.
B. Relationship with Public Enforcement
The Graham decision has rendered the second requirement of
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 virtually meaningless
as well. The statute provides that attorney fees may be awarded if “the
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement
by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make
the award appropriate . . . .”73
This requirement that private enforcement be necessary has firm
grounding in public policy.74 Public agency enforcement of rights is
preferable in most instances, and almost certainly here where the
purported public interest is the prevention of false advertising.75 Public
prosecutors do not benefit financially from bringing certain cases, so
72. The facts of the Graham case itself demonstrate that the court’s definition of
“public benefit” will permit an award of attorneys’ fees to generate a net economic loss
for society. The cost of modifying the Dakota truck so that its towing capacity would
conform to what was advertised was $300 per truck, and fewer than 1000 Californians
purchased the affected trucks. Graham, 101 P.3d at 144-45. The case does not mention
any injury that occurred because of the false advertising, and it appears that at the time
the complaint was filed, DaimlerChrysler already “notified existing buyers of the error
[and] told them not to attempt to tow more than 2,000 pounds . . . .” Id. at 145. The
danger of future accidents was thus abated, and so the benefit accruing to all the
California truck purchasers, whether or not they were plaintiffs in this case, was
collectively no more than $300,000 ($300 x 1000 truck purchasers). However, even
discounting the appellate litigation over fees, the lodestar amount awarded to the
plaintiffs’ attorneys was $329,620. Id. at 146. Graham thus sanctions the award of fees
where the costs of litigation exceed the recovery, and there is no intangible public right
being protected. The economic irrationality of this holding is only compounded by
considering the defendant’s legal costs and avoidance costs.
73. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
74. The policy justifications for the private attorney general model are discussed in
Thomas, supra note 31, 846-47.
75. See Graham, 101 P.3d at 146 (discussing the trial court finding that the
plaintiffs’ efforts secured consumer protection).

1307

LOGAN.DOC

12/22/2005 11:23 AM

they may choose to pursue the violations they find most egregious.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys, on the other hand, are quite naturally attracted to
the cases that will generate the largest fees and damage awards,
regardless of whether such actions benefit society the most. Plaintiffs’
attorneys likewise may represent clients whose interests conflict with
those other aggrieved members of the public because of the finite
resources available for compensation.76 Public prosecutors, however,
are not, at least in theory, beholden to the interests of a discrete group of
clients.
The private attorney general model of vindicating public rights is
preferable only in certain clearly defined situations. For example, the
private attorney general model is essential for protecting private citizens
against government violations of their civil rights. Forcing one
government entity to litigate such claims against another government
entity runs counter to the basic rationales for our adversarial system of
civil justice.77 Likewise, the private attorney general model may be
appropriate where government resources are inadequate to bring suit.78
Neither justification, however, is present in the Graham case. To
the extent that Graham’s suit attempts to vindicate a public interest at
all—preventing false advertising—there is no reason to believe that it is
necessary or even preferable that this right be vindicated by a private
party. The defendant is not a government entity, and therefore there is
no concern that a civil rights challenge will not be vigorously
prosecuted.
Even more shocking in Graham is that both the Santa Cruz District
Attorney and the California Attorney General had initiated an
investigation of DaimlerChrysler’s practices by late July 1999.79 When
Graham’s attorney filed a complaint on August 23, the public agency
actions were already under way.80 While it is true that the public entities
had not filed suit against the carmaker, they had refrained because they
wished to give DaimlerChrysler an opportunity to respond before
76. See, for example, the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of this problem
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The asbestos litigation
would almost certainly bankrupt the corporation, so in settlement the plaintiffs’ attorneys
were required to apportion damages among those who had already experienced medical
problems and those who were only at risk for future problems. Id. at 603-04.
77. See Thomas, supra note 31, at 856 (“Private enforcement is necessary when
the public entities fail to litigate the case.”).
78. In Serrano III, in which the California Supreme Court recognized the
applicability of the private attorney general model for vindication of constitutional rights,
the court offered the unsatisfying explanation that “for various reasons the burden of
enforcement is not always adequately carried by [public prosecutors].” Serrano v. Priest,
569 P.2d 1303, 1313 (Cal. 1977).
79. Graham, 101 P.3d at 145.
80. Id.
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commencing litigation.81 In this brief window of several weeks, Graham’s
attorney filed his tagalong suit.82 It is simply perverse to insist, as the
trial court apparently did, that the public agencies’ desire to prevent
litigation strengthened the plaintiffs’ attorney’s argument that his own
intervention was therefore necessary.
Even if one were to argue that the intervention of the public entities
did not render the private action duplicative, it is appropriate to compare
the records of the public and private actions in placing pressure on
DaimlerChrysler to change its behavior. Graham’s action was dismissed
as moot, and it is likely that the complaint was moot the moment it was
filed.83 The plaintiffs therefore received no compensation that the
carmaker had not already offered at the time the private suit commenced.
On the other hand, the public entity suit, which focused on the false
advertising claim and not the breach of warranty claim, continued after
the private suit was dismissed, as the carmaker continued to distribute
misleading marketing materials.84 DaimlerChrysler eventually settled
the matter with the government for $75,000 and agreed not to use the
materials again.85 The private plaintiffs never won a penny or wrung a
legal commitment out of the carmaker not to use the false marketing
materials.
The California Supreme Court reviewed the award of attorneys’ fees
to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in this case under an abuse of discretion
standard. On the facts on this case, however, it is very difficult to see
how a future trial court could possibly abuse its discretion by finding
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. DaimlerChrysler sent a letter to all purchasers of the Dakota R/T truck on June
16, 1999, acknowledging its error. Id. at 145. By the “summer,” the carmaker had
“authorized dealers to repurchase or replace Dakota R/Ts on a case-by-case basis, but
only for customers who demanded such a remedy.” Id. After the complaint was filed,
DaimlerChrysler agreed to repurchase all of the falsely advertised trucks. Id. The only
relief that DaimlerChrysler offered after the filing of the complaint that it had not offered
before was to actively offer to repurchase the trucks, rather than simply to acquiesce in
this demand from its customers. Id. The Graham court, at the request of the California
Attorney General, adopted a rule that the “plaintiff seeking attorney fees under a catalyst
theory must first reasonably attempt to settle the matter short of litigation.” Id. at 155
(citations omitted). Thus, if Graham failed to present his demands to DaimerChrysler, he
has not met this consultation requirement. If he did make such demands, the trial court’s
findings of fact indicate that he would have received an offer of repurchase, so his suit
would have been moot at the moment it was filed.
84. Id. at 145-46.
85. Id. at 146.

1309

LOGAN.DOC

12/22/2005 11:23 AM

that such a tagalong suit is “necessary” and thus fulfills the strictures of
section 1021.5. Graham is the prototypical example of when a private
attorney is not appropriate. The California Supreme Court’s refusal to
reverse the lower court’s finding of the necessity of private
enforcement—when two public entities have threatened suit and the
defendant has already conceded its mistake in a written letter to its
consumers—has essentially read this requirement out of the statute.
C. What is a Successful Party?
The most contentious issue in the suit, however, was whether Graham
could be considered a “successful party” to whom the award of attorneys’
fees was appropriate under section 1021.5. The California Supreme
Court has never interpreted the phrase “successful party” to mean that a
party may receive attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5 only if it pursues
a suit to a final judgment. In Westside Community for Independent
Living, Inc. v. Obledo, the high court rejected such an interpretation of
the language.86 Instead, the court, per Chief Justice Rose Bird, endorsed
the “catalyst test,” which provides that a “plaintiff will be considered a
‘successful party’ where an important right is vindicated ‘by activating
defendants to modify their behavior.’”87
Although a number of lower federal courts also adopted this “catalyst”
approach to defining “successful party,”88 the United States Supreme
Court rejected it in Buckhannon.89 Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
writing for a five-to-four court, observed that the catalyst theory “allows
an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal
relationship of the parties.”90 Thus, a “defendant’s voluntary change in
86. 657 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1983).
87. Id. at 367 (quoting Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1981))
(internal quotations omitted). Justice Chin, however, argues that Westside Community
did not adopt the catalyst approach because the claim for attorneys’ fees was ultimately
rejected, rendering the statements about who may constitute a catalyst to be dicta. This
is somewhat problematic, however, as the Westfield Community court had to determine if
the plaintiffs’ actions were sufficient to invoke the catalyst theory in order to reach the
question of causation.
88. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 n.3 (2001) (collecting the circuit court cases embracing the
“catalyst” approach).
89. Id. at 610. The Graham court was dismissive of the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a “successful party.” Graham, 101 P.3d at
150. Interestingly, the Westside Community court a generation before had explained that
“[section] 1021.5 codified the common law theory of the private attorney general. The
Legislature relied heavily on federal precedent when enacting the statute, and California
courts often look to federal decisions when interpreting it.” Westside Cmty., 657 P.2d at
367 n.5.
90. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
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conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to
achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the
change.”91
The disagreements between Chief Justices Bird and Rehnquist, and
later between the majority and dissent in Graham, reveal a difficult
problem in defining who is a successful party. If a defendant can escape
attorneys’ fees by voluntarily changing his conduct, he will have an
incentive to avoid any judicially sanctioned settlement. The cessation of
his conduct will moot the claim, at least for injunctive relief, and the
plaintiffs’ attorney will have no right to fees.92 On the other hand,
91. Id. It should be noted, however, that Buckhannon did not present exactly the
same question as did Graham. In the former, the plaintiff was a corporation that
operated assisted living facilities. West Virginia’s Fire Marshal attempted to shut down
its facilities because “some of the residents were incapable of ‘self-preservation’ as
defined under state law.” Id. at 600. Buckhannon sued on behalf of itself and similarly
situated care homes on the ground that the state’s action violated the federal Fair
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id.
at 600-01. The following year, the West Virginia legislature enacted a law that repealed
the “self-preservation” requirement. Id. at 601. Buckhannon argued that its suit had
“catalyzed” the legislature’s remedial action. Id. at 600-02.
Buckhannon thus differs from Graham in four important respects, three of which
present a more sympathetic argument for the award of attorneys’ fees than in Graham.
First, as Buckhannon sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, clearly its action
transcended its parochial economic interests more than Graham’s suit. Second,
Buckhannon sued a state agency, not a private party, and thus the necessity of private
enforcement was surely greater than in Graham. Third, Congress explicitly extended
one-way fee-shifting provisions to both the FHAA and the ADA, while the California
Supreme Court has expanded the range of suits eligible for fee-shifting under section
1021.5 without the further endorsement of the state legislature.
On the other hand, Buckhannon argued that it had catalyzed a change in policy of a
state legislature, which presents seemingly insuperable evidentiary problems. How does
one determine the reasons that individual state legislators voted for the bill? Would it
matter if most knew nothing of Buckhannon’s suit but otherwise thought the reform to be
desirable? Individual legislators had no personal economic stake that was threatened by
a successful suit, so it is difficult to assess the catalyzing effect of the suit.
92. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed skepticism in his Buchkannon majority
opinion that the failure to adopt the catalyst rule would encourage defendants to
unilaterally moot suits, labeling such claims “entirely speculative and unsupported by
any empirical evidence . . . .” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.
Even if empirical research reveals that defendants do seek to moot actions to avoid
attorneys’ fees, the risk of such action is already built into the contingency fee multiplier
that the court may award. For example, in Graham, the plaintiffs’ fees were multiplied
by a factor of 2.25 to account for the risk of bringing the action as a contingency.
Graham, 101 P.3d at 163 (Chin, J., dissenting). Moreover, in those cases where the
defendant moots the action by ceasing the objectionable practice, the plaintiff has won
what he sought, and the defendant’s costs in conforming its practices are minimized.
One would think that such a result would be welcomed rather than shunned.
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awarding attorneys’ fees without the “imprimatur” of the court on the
merits could dramatically encourage pointless litigation. Even if the
parties were to avoid a trial, they would be required to litigate the merits
of the case to determine whether there is a proper causal nexus between
the civil action and the defendant’s “voluntary” change in conduct.
The Graham court apparently believed that it solved this problem by
requiring courts awarding attorneys’ fees to ensure that a causal nexus
exists between the plaintiff’s attorneys’ action and the defendant’s
change in conduct,93 and that the claim is “not frivolous, unreasonable,
or groundless.”94 The fatal flaw in the majority’s line of reasoning is
that it is not merely actions that are egregious enough to be legally
frivolous that result in breakdowns of judicial economy, but the filing of
large numbers of suits that have little chance of success on the merits.
Under California law, an action is defined as “frivolous” only if it is
“totally and completely without merit” or brought “for the sole purpose
of harassing an opposing party.”95 The Graham rule will only inhibit the
filing of the most blatantly meritless suits, which are already
discouraged by the sanctions and cost-shifting provisions of California
Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5.
The goal of an attorneys’ fees regime and the tort system in general
should be to encourage the optimal number of lawsuits that will produce
social benefits. The difficult question is how the system should treat the
vast number of suits that have some merit, that is, that are neither legally
93. The Graham court also adopted the Attorney General’s proposal that “a
plaintiff seeking attorney fees under a catalyst theory must first reasonably attempt to
settle the matter short of litigation.” Id. at 155.
94. Id. at 154 (quoting Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 752 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The majority states that the inquiry into the merits of the case should be similar to that
undertaken in considering a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. This would seem to
indicate that the majority has in mind a weighing of the “likelihood of success on the
merits,” the test I propose in Part IV. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley,
344 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the Graham majority characterizes this
inquiry as “a determination at a minimum that the questions of law or fact are grave and
difficult,” Graham, 101 P.3d at 154 (internal quotations omitted), which does not appear
to require an examination of the merits at all.
Moreover, the Graham majority explicitly states that it is adopting the two-pronged test
developed by the lower federal courts, the second prong of which is that “a finding that
the lawsuit was not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Id. (quoting Stivers v.
Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 752 n.9 (9th Cir. 1995)). It then proceeds to reject a proposed
requirement that the plaintiff’s action be able to survive a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that this rule is too narrow, excluding suits that have been unilaterally mooted
by defendants. Id. at 154-55. The court does explain that the favorable result for the
plaintiff must be “achieved by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance or threat of
expense.” Id. at 154 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court’s willingness,
however, to sanction fees on the facts of this case indicates that the threat of victory need
not be a promising one. After Graham, the rule appears to contain no requirement that
the suit be likely to prevail on the merits, merely that it is not frivolous. Id.
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(2) (West Supp. 2005).
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frivolous nor clearly persuasive. California has chosen to address this
issue by adopting a strong preference for the settlement of civil disputes.
For example, the state has granted trial court judges the authority to
compel settlement conferences among the litigants,96 and has enacted
modified two-way cost-shifting following settlement offers.97 Implicit in
this policy is that it is neither possible nor desirable for all civil actions
to be litigated. Instead, an action has a “value” that is determined by the
damages that would be expected at trial discounted by the probability
that the suit may fail for substantive or procedural reasons, minus the
costs of litigating the suit.98 A well-functioning tort system will strike a
balance between the incentives of plaintiffs and defendants so that the
settlement value of individual claims closely approximate their social
utility.
The Graham approach, however, serves to upset the delicate equilibrium
that exists under a pure American rule in two fundamental ways. First,
the Graham regime decouples the link in suits seeking to vindicate
private rights between the merits of an action and the plaintiffs’
attorney’s incentives to bring suit. Where plaintiffs’ attorneys operate
on contingency fees under a pure American rule, the value of a suit will
be the expected economic recovery for the plaintiff multiplied by the
probability of success on the merits, minus the costs of litigation to the
plaintiff’s attorney.99 This system, while imperfect, at least serves to
discourage some socially unproductive suits, such as those in which the
cost of litigation would exceed the recovery, or nonfrivolous suits in
which the chances of success on the merits are remote.
Under Graham, however, a plaintiffs’ attorney can garner fees in
virtually any tort action so long as he can characterize the suit as a
“consumer protection” action that benefits a large number of people. No
expected return for his client is too trifling, as he may collect fees no
matter how small the recovery. Indeed, in Graham, the clients received
no award of damages at all, but the attorneys still won $762,830 in
fees.100 The majority was wholly unconcerned that this staggering
96. CAL. CT. R. 222(a) (2005).
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West Supp. 2005).
98. For a discussion of the valuation of suits for plaintiffs’ attorneys, see Beasley
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 462-64 (Ct. App. 1991).
99. For a general discussion of the role of attorneys’ fees and fee-shifting statutes
in altering the litigants’ strategies during settlement, see Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S.
Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69-81 (1997).
100. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 101 P.3d 140, 161 (Cal. 2004) (Chin, J., dissenting).
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amount might have been far out of proportion to the harm suffered by
the plaintiffs or the reasonable avoidance costs for DaimlerChrysler.
Second, the various holdings in Graham together transform the
incentives for bringing tagalong suits. Consider again the hypothetical
attorney in Part I deciding whether to file suit. His potential fee award
for filing suit is huge—the attorneys in Graham earned approximately
$76,000, excluding fees on fees, for filing a seven-page complaint.101
After Graham, however, the potential risks to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in
pursuing such a windfall are minimal. The attorney need not be concerned
that the costs of litigation may outweigh the potential damages because
his fees are not awarded out of the damages. He need not consider the
costs of actually litigating the case, as no ruling on the merits is
necessary to collect his fees. Most importantly, he need not be
concerned that his case may be far from meritorious. So long as the case
is not frivolous, he is eligible to recover fees. The plaintiff’s attorney
risks very little of his own time and capital in preparing and filing such a
complaint.
The most important variables for the plaintiffs’ attorney’s calculations
are whether the defendant will actually change its policy and whether the
plaintiff can establish a causal nexus between the filing of the complaint
and that change. In tagalong suits, the defendants may change their
policies anyway in response to public agency pressures. But, as Graham
clearly shows, the existence of parallel government action will not
invalidate a plaintiffs’ attorney’s claim for attorneys’ fees. As a practical
matter, the causal nexus will normally be shown by circumstantial
evidence of the date of the plaintiff’s filing, the defendant’s knowledge
of the suit, and the date the policy changed. The low costs and risks of
preparing complaints thus provide plaintiffs’ attorneys every incentive to
tag along to public agency actions in the hope that the dates will
properly align to support an award of attorneys’ fees. If a plaintiffs’
attorney is diligent in following public agency investigations and files
enough suits, he is sure to reap a windfall eventually. These are the
incentives that Graham has created.
IV. REFORMING GRAHAM: THE COMPARATIVE CATALYST
Justice Chin recognized in his dissent that the Graham decision “goes
farther than this court has ever gone before—indeed, so far as I can tell,
further than any other court has ever gone . . . ,” placing California far
outside of the mainstream of federal and other state practices regarding
101. Id. at 163 (Chin, J., dissenting) (“[R]oughly 90 percent of [the $762,830
attorneys’ fees] award was for fees plaintiffs generated while seeking fees.”).
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attorneys’ fees.102 The Graham decision also appears to be out of step
with the voters of California, who in November 2004 passed Proposition
64, which entrenches in state law a strong preference for public over
private enforcement of certain consumer rights under California
Business and Professions Code section 17200.103 The potential for a
further explosion of litigation in California through the application of
section 1021.5 to run-of-the-mill tort suits militates in favor of a similar
intervention through the initiative process or by the state legislature.
Reform of California’s attorneys’ fees statute in light of Graham must
have two guiding principles. First, the phrase “important right affecting
the public interest” should be tightened so that it will encompass civil
rights claims, but cannot be used to turn every breach of warranty action
into a “public interest” suit. The preferred solution would be for
California to follow the federal model and specify the individual statutes
under which claims can give rise to attorneys’ fees. This would allow
the legislators who devise a particular regulatory scheme to choose the
degree to which they believe private enforcement is appropriate.
There will still be borderline cases, though, such as section 17200
claims, in which it is difficult to adopt a blanket rule. Therefore, the
legislative process should adopt some language similar to the following:
Attorneys’ fees shall not be awarded where the plaintiff succeeds in altering the
behavior of a defendant primarily through the threat of compensatory damages,
out of which the plaintiff would receive any recovery, imposed on the
defendant.104

102. Id. at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting).
103. For a thorough discussion of the abuses of the private attorney general model
which gave rise to Proposition 64, see Mathieu Blackston, Comment, California’s Unfair
Competition Law—Making Sure the Avenger Is Not Guilty of the Greater Crime, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2004).
104. This clause anticipates California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s proposal to
“redirect” punitive damage awards. Because punitive damages are meant to penalize and
deter the defendant, and not to compensate the plaintiff, such damages should be paid to
state coffers rather than individual plaintiffs, much as a civil penalty in a securities or tax
fraud case brought by the federal government. Governor Schwarzenegger’s plan would
therefore require that seventy-five percent of the punitive damage award to be paid to the
state. Adam Liptak, Schwarzenegger Sees Money for State in Punitive Damages, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2004, at A16. In the event that such a proposal were enacted into law,
the language I have proposed would still allow for a recovery of attorneys’ fees if only
punitive damages were awarded. This would be a classic case in which the financial
incentives to the plaintiff might not otherwise be adequate to vindicate a public interest
that transcends the parochial financial interests of the plaintiff.
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An award of attorneys’ fees is only appropriate where the relief sought and
obtained by the plaintiff transcends the private economic rights that he or she
may vindicate.

Under this rule, Graham would not be able to receive attorneys’ fees for
his breach of warranty claim because DaimerChrysler was only reacting
to the threat of damages. If, however, Graham had sought and achieved an
injunction against DaimlerChrysler’s false marketing practices, he would be
eligible for attorneys’ fees, because this sort of action may otherwise have
been an underproduced action in the market for legal representation.
The second guiding principle in reforming California’s statute should
be redefining the catalyst model to weed out awards for socially
unproductive tagalong suits. The abolition of the catalyst rule through a
requirement that the plaintiff actually achieve a ruling on the merits of
the case would be most effective to prevent such suits. However, if this
is not politically possible, a compromise solution is presented by a
“comparative catalyst” model that would discourage the most egregious
tagalong suits, yet also remove the incentive of defendants to unilaterally
moot actions against them to prevent an award of attorneys’ fees.
Under the Graham approach, the trial judge determines whether the
plaintiff’s complaint was a “substantial factor” in changing the defendant’s
behavior.105 Such a binary determination, though, does not accurately
reflect the value of the suit to society, especially considering the inherently
slippery meaning of the term “substantial.” Defendants may face many
legal pressures to change their behavior. In some cases, especially civil
rights cases, the private suit may be the exclusive pressure applied to the
defendant. In tagalong suits, however, the private suit is part of a mix of
legal pressures including the threat of public enforcement. The marginal
value to society of a meritorious suit in the first instance is far greater
than the second, even though both may be deemed “substantial” by a
court awarding attorneys’ fees.
A comparative catalyst standard would instruct the trial judge to
determine to what degree the plaintiff’s action contributed to the overall
mix of legal pressures that forced the defendant to change his conduct.
The value of the suit would be expressed as a multiplier between zero
and one, then multiplied by the lodestar amount.106 The comparative
catalyst would act just like multipliers for contingency fees, tackling
difficult legal issues, or the like, that are recognized under current law,
except that it could be used to reduce or maintain the value of an award
105. Graham, 101 P.3d at 149.
106. The lodestar amount is defined as the “basic fee for comparable legal services
in the community,” determined by multiplying the time expended by the attorneys on the
suit by the prevailing hourly rate. Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 741 (Cal. 2001).
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rather than to increase it.107 Attorneys who bring the most socially valuable
suits—usually civil rights cases or consumer cases seeking injunctive
relief where public agencies have refused to act—would likely receive
full compensation, because their actions would be the sole source of
legal pressure. On the other hand, in a case such as Graham in which
the civil complaint tagged along with an ongoing public investigation,
the civil suit may have constituted only, say, sixty percent of the legal
pressure that forced the changes. Thus, if the trial court in Graham had
adopted such a finding under a comparative catalyst rule, the court
would have awarded the plaintiff’s attorneys $457,698 ($762,830 x
0.6).108
The advantage of the comparative catalyst approach is that it creates a
sliding scale to measure the social contribution of actions filed by
plaintiffs’ attorneys that aligns the incentive to file suit with the social
good that results. The comparative catalyst approach thus considers not
just the “fair market value” of the suit to an attorney, but the fair market
value of the suit to society.109 If a civil action would be duplicative of
public agency actions, the fair market value of the suit to society is
lower; the attorney would have less of an incentive to file suit because of
the multiplier. This approach more accurately conforms to the private
attorney general model—private litigation should receive special
encouragement in the form of attorneys’ fees provisions if the actions of
public entities are inadequate to the task.
In his dissent in Graham, Justice Chin observed that the catalyst
theory requires courts to make the very difficult assessment of the
alleged causal connection between the filing of the civil complaint and a
defendant’s decision to change its behavior.110 This is especially
problematic where the defendant is a corporate or government entity
whose subjective intent is elusive. It may be argued that a comparative
catalyst approach would complicate this matter even further by requiring
107. California law also recognizes multipliers for “the skill displayed in
presenting” the legal issues to the court and “the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys . . . .” Id.
108. Note that such a comparative catalyst rule would not exclude the other
multipliers currently applied by the courts. In Graham, for example, the calculation
would have been the lodestar amount multiplied by the contingency fee multiplier (2.25)
multiplied by the comparative catalyst fraction (0.6). Graham, 101 P.3d at 146.
109. See Ketchum, 17 P.3d at 741 (discussing lodestar multiplier’s correlation with
fair market value).
110. Graham, 101 P.3d at 168 (Chin, J., dissenting).

1317

LOGAN.DOC

12/22/2005 11:23 AM

a court to pin down not only whether the defendant was influenced by
the complaint, but by how much.
This problem, however, can be avoided if the court awarding the
attorneys’ fees adopts an objective rather a subjective test for the actual
apportionment of credit for catalyzing behavior. The court should weigh
the complaint as would a reasonable attorney representing the defendant
in the case. It should examine whether the complaint is facially moot or
frivolous in light of the facts conceded in the case. The court need not
undertake a probing inquiry of the merits. It should proceed much as it
would in considering the likelihood of success on the merits in an
emergency injunction request.111 In assessing the pressure asserted by a
complaint, the court would thus consider both the merits, at least
superficially, and the role of the suit in changing the defendant’s conduct
vis-à-vis the actions of public agency action and voluntary actions already
commenced at the time the complaint was filed. It is true that a judge may
not understand the factual situation giving rise to the case in the same
intimate detail as the defense attorney, and thus he or she does not know
whether discovery will strengthen or weaken the plaintiffs’ claims.
Nonetheless, trial court judges in California have extensive experience in
overseeing settlement negotiations and are well positioned to evaluate how
a particular complaint may affect the overall mix of legal pressures.
Another benefit of a well-drafted comparative catalyst rule is that it
could dramatically reduce the appellate litigation over attorneys’ fees
which Justice Brennan decried.112 If the abuse of discretion standard is
retained, it will be much more difficult to overturn a trial judge’s
designation of some fraction for attorneys’ fees rather than a binary
all-or-nothing decision. In practice, a California appeals court is less
likely to overturn a forty percent award it believes should be sixty
percent than a zero percent award that, given two choices, it believes
should have been one hundred percent. Such, for better or worse, has been
the experience with appellate review of large punitive and noneconomic
damage awards. Appellate courts in such situations have usually
overturned such awards only if they believe the order of magnitude to be
wrong, not just that the award was off by twenty percent.113
111. In considering a motion for a preliminary injunction, a court may consider the
“likelihood of success on the merits,” even though at this time little or no discovery may
have taken place. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 917
(9th Cir. 2003).
112. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. See, for example, the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of what
constitutes “excessive” punitive damages in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 568 (1996). The court refused to establish a specific ratio of punitive to economic
damages above which an award becomes excessive, rejecting the notion that the line of
permissible damages “is marked by a simple mathematical formula . . . .” Id. at 582.
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The exception would lie where the multiplier is most easily quantifiable,
which would protect civil rights plaintiffs. Thus, if a private plaintiff,
unsupported by the actions of other public agencies, won an injunction
against, for example, a discriminatory government practice, the application
of any multiplier less than one may be an abuse of discretion subject to
reversal. On the other hand, the application of any multiplier above zero
may be an abuse of discretion if a plaintiff’s attorney’s efforts merely
involved filing a facially moot or frivolous complaint. However, the
adoption of a sliding scale rather than a binary determination will reduce the
incentive of litigants to file appeals in all but the most egregious cases.
V. CONCLUSION
These modest reform proposals are an attempt to forestall the
potentially devastating effects of the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Graham on judicial economy in the state’s courts. The
California legislature has undertaken major legislative projects to reduce
the amount of litigation in the courts without denying remedies to
meritorious plaintiffs. To this end, it has enacted fast track requirements
and limited fee shifting following settlement conferences.114 The Graham
decision will severely undermine these efforts by encouraging socially
unproductive tagalong suits through the catalyst theory. Moreover, Graham
further shifts the risks of litigation away from plaintiffs by extending the
rationale of civil rights fee-shifting to suits that seek to vindicate economic
interests without transcendent benefits for society. Such a regime threatens
to subvert the policy goals of loss spreading by further severing the
connections between the prophylactic measures undertaken by corporate
defendants and their expected liabilities. Ultimately, it is the California
consumer who will pay higher prices without any appreciable benefit in
terms of improved public safety. The adoption of a stricter definition of
“public interest” litigation and a comparative catalyst rule will serve to
stem the flood of unproductive lawsuits the high court’s ill-conceived
decision will otherwise unleash.
KEVIN LOGAN

Instead, the court noted that the 500 to 1 ratio in Gore was an order of magnitude higher
than anything that had been previously upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 581-83.
114. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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